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But this great early representative of the modern spirit had also the instincts of a schoolman : he must needs reduce this same concrete and moving universe to the terms of a completely rationalized formula, and conceive of it as characterized in every fiber of its content by the eternal fixity of the logical necessities which in reality belong only to the supra-temporal relations of abstract and general concepts. For this purpose, the scheme of ideas which the Middle Ages had inherited and elaborated from Neo-Platonism lay ready to his hand. That scheme itself expressed something of both tendencies, though the bias in favor of the assertion of the superior reality of the eternal and universal had been clearer in it. The very ambiguities of the scheme, and especially, as M. Rivaud shows, the multiple ambiguities of the notions of essence and existence, — both separately and in their relations to one another, — served Spinoza's dual needs the better. It will probably remain always debatable whether we can better represent the result by saying that Spinoza's new wine burst the old bottles, or by saying that the process of bottling destroyed the fire and flavor of the new wine. One cannot always agree with M. Rivaud's account of the relative distribution of emphasis between the two sides of Spinoza's thought ; and the author does not quite perfectly succeed, perhaps, in setting forth in sharp outline the precise articulation of all the main elements in Spinoza's reasoning. But the book must take an exceptional place among Spinoza studies, both for the insight and sound historic sense shown in the general conclusions, and for the scholarly thoroughness of its detailed analyses.

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Leibniz's Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie. Übersetzt von A. BUCHENAU ; mit Einleitungen und Erläuterungen herausgegeben von ERNST CASSIRER. Leipzig, Verlag der Dürr'schen Buchhandlung, 1906. 2 Bde. — pp. 374, 582.

These volumes contain an extensive, and for the greater part judicious, selection from the writings of Leibniz, arranged topically and in logical sequence, so as to exhibit the Leibnizian system in a connected form, such as Leibniz himself never took the time to give to it. The French and Latin writings are translated into German by Dr. Buchenau. This translation will not add to the value of the volumes for the English reader, who will naturally prefer to read Leibniz's original ; it is, indeed, hard to see why any student of the sort likely to use a work of this kind, should be supposed to require a translation of Leibniz's very clear and easy French and Latin into German not always quite so clear. Two other peculiarities of this collection further prevent it from serving (as it otherwise might) as the standard compend of the more indispensable Leibnizian writings. For some reason, nothing is included from either the *Nouveaux essais* or the *Théodicée*. And the range of selections is not sufficient to bring out ade-

quately the fact that Leibniz's thought upon certain problems underwent development, and that at certain points he remained to the end hesitant or self-contradictory. In particular, there is no sufficient representation of Leibniz's more or less wavering utterances in regard to the logical status and the demonstrative scope of the Principles of Contradiction and of Sufficient Reason. With these exceptions, however, the compilation is excellently done, and affords, in a convenient and inexpensive form, a well-ordered and detailed exposition of Leibniz's principal doctrines by Leibniz himself. Good use is made of selections from the correspondence, especially for the elucidation and amplification of the doctrine of monads, too briefly set forth in the several short formal treatises which Leibniz devoted to the subject. One of the once-disputed letters of Leibniz, — an extremely interesting one on the Principle of Continuity, — cited by Koenig in his famous controversy with Maupertuis, is here printed (both in the original French and in translation), for the first time in any edition of Leibniz's writings. Competent and instructive introductions, of an historical and expository sort, are provided by Dr. Cassirer for each of the sections into which the collection is divided.

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Life and Matter: A Criticism of Professor Haeckel's "Riddle of the Universe." By Sir OLIVER LODGE. New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905. — pp. ix, 175.

We have here another criticism of Haeckel's *Weltraethsel*, this time from the camp of the scientists. The author seeks to counteract the harm done among unbalanced and uncultured persons by the spread of Haeckel's writings, and offers his book as an antidote against the speculative and destructive portions of the German biologist's work. He meets the world-riddle man on scientific ground, and shows "that he has underestimated some classes of fact and has stretched scientific theory into regions of guess work and hypothesis where it loses touch with real science altogether." "At present," he says, "the scheme formulated by Professor Haeckel must to philosophers appear rudimentary and antiquated, while to men of science it appears gratuitous, hypothetical, in some places erroneous, and altogether unconvincing."

The law of substance, establishing the eternal persistence of matter and force, upon which Haeckel bases his entire system and which he regards as axiomatic, is far from being self-evident, according to Professor Lodge. It may hereafter be possible to discover new forms of energy, in which case the definition may have to be modified. "But after all, this is not specially important: the *serious* mistake which people are apt to make concerning this law of energy is to imagine that it denies the possibility of guidance, control, or directing agency, whereas really it has nothing to say on these topics; it relates to *amount* alone. Philosophers have been far